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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information and complaint 
with the crime of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOh'ER COURT 
The appellant, Ralph LeRoy Menzies, was convicted 
by a jury before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., of 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County on 
February 6, 1979, and was thereafter sentenced to be 
cohlmitted to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges affirmance of the conviction 
and sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 17th day of July, 1978, a Tongan, Valfoa 
Lealaitafea (hereafter victim), while eQployed as a taxi 
driver, went to the area of Fourth East and Seventh South 
to pick up a customer. A man, subsequently identified by 
the victim as the appellant, approached the taxi and 
entered from the right rear door of the vehicle. After the 
victim had driven a short distance, the appellant pulled a 
gun and pc~G~cd it directly at the victim. After stopping 
the vehicle, the victim was ordered to place his money in 
a paper bag, which he did. Then the victim was shot in the 
arm as he attempted to grab the gun away from the appellant. 
The appellant, still a passenger in the vehicle, broke out 
a window of the taxi and fled on foot. During the robbery, 
the victim repeatedly looked at his assailant and he did 
so with the intent of remembering the man at a later 
date (R.l32). 
The victim was shown an array of seven photographs 
within a week of the incident, one of which was a picture 
of the appellant, Ralph L. Menzies. The victim identifed 
that picture as being familiar and he stated the hair of 
the individual in the photo was similar to that of his 
-2-
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assailant (R.l28-l29). About two weeks later the victim 
again was shown a series of eight photographs, including 
a more recent picture of appellant. From that array, 
he positively identified the appellant as the man who 
robbed and shot him on the 17th of July, 1978 (R.l30). 
Both photographic displays were conducted by 
Detective William L. Abbott of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department. On the occasion of the first showing, he 
testified that from ten or twelve pictures he had chosen 
seven, one of which was the appellants. The six 
additional pictures were chosen because they were similar 
to the appellant's picture in facial features as well as 
hair length and style. The second photographic array was 
a series of eight photographs taken from a group of two 
hundred photographs, and again each of the seven were 
chosen because of their likeness to the appellant in 
ethnic and racial features, hair color and facial 
characteristics. A second picture of the appellant, which 
was taken at a time sequence more contemporary with the 
incident, was included in the second lineup and Officer 
Abbott testified that the victim made a positive and 
absolute identification of the appellant during his 
review of the second series of pictures. On both 
occasions DetectiveAbbotthanded the photographs to the 
v1ctim and asked him to review them and see if any one 
-3-
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of the pictures was of the man that robbed him. After 
having identified the defendant at the second photographic 
lineup, the victim made several in-court identifications 
of the appellant. 
While confined in the county jail on an unrelated 
matter, the appellant stated to several other inmates that 
he had been involved in a robbery and during the incident 
he had blown a Samoan or Tongan cab driver away. One of 
the other inmates, Louis Jaramillo, overheard the appellant 
and reported the information to a member of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department. He subsequently testified at the 
appellant's trlal that the appellant had admitted robbing 
and shootlng a taxi driver of Tongan or Samoan ancestry. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED 
WAS PROPERLY AD;1ITTED FOR THE JURY'S 
CONSIDERATION BASED ON THE INDEPENDENT 
RECOLLECTION OF THE VICTIM. 
Respondent urges the Court to affirm the lower 
court's conviction of the appellant based on the well-
established rule of law that an in-court identification 
may be properly admitted if the basis of that identificatioD 
is the observations of the suspect independent of the lineup 
identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
-4-
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87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 
388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 
L. Ed. 2 d ll 7 8 ( 196 7) . In setting forth the test to be 
applied, the court in Wade quoted from its decision 
in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471, 488, 83 
S . C t . 4 0 7 , 4 1 7 , 9 L . Ed. 2 d 4 41 ( 196 3 ) : 
Whether, granting establishment 
of the primary illegality, the evidence 
to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint. 
Id. at 417. 
The Court then set forth specific factors to 
be considered in applying the test, including the 
witnesses' opportunity to observe the criminal act, any 
discrepancies between the pre-lineup description and the 
defendant's actual description, the identification by 
picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure 
to identify the defendant on prior occasions, and the 
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup 
identification. United States v. Wade, at 1938. 
In adopting the holdings of the line of cases 
set forth above, the Supreme Court of Utah held that an 
in-court identification of the victim was admissible 
1f the identification had an independent, original source. 
State\'. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
-~- J 
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When the State can successfully show that the in-court 
identification is a product of the witnesses' observations 
of the defendant at the time of the incident, the 
identification may be admitted even if the pre-trial 
identification procedures were procedurally tainted in 
the same way. United States v. Wade, supra; 
Gilbert v. California, supra; State v. Vasquez, 
supra. 
In this case there is ample evidence to support 
the conclusion that the victim identified the appellant 
at the t~~e of trial based solely on his observation 
of hi~ at ~~e tlme of the robbery. Mr. Lealaitafea 
testified that he saw the appellant enter his taxi 
through the right rear door. He again observed him when 
the appellant spoke to him, and at that time he saw the 
gun. After stopping the car, and placing his money in 
a bag the victim again got a close look at his assailant 
as he handed him the bag. Prior to the assailant's 
fleeing the vehicle, the victim looked at him at least on 
two additional occasions, and he testified that he studied 
the assailant's face carefully so that he could recognize 
him at a later date (R.l32). The incident lasted about 
fifteen minutes and the victim testified that there was 
adequate light to allow hi~ to make a positive identificatic~ 
-6-
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of his assailant both at the time of the incident and 
at the trial. As in the Vasquez case, there was substantial 
and competent evidence to support the determination of the 
trial court that the identification testimony had an 
independent source and was therefore properly submitted 
to the jury for its consideration. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT 
COULD BE ADMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION 
OF THE JURY. 
The appellant urged the trial court to suppress 
the evidence concerning the victim's identification of the 
appellant at pre-trial photographic lineups because of 
an allegation of prejudice surrounding the procedures 
used at those lineups. His motion was denied. Although 
the appellant properly cites Simmons v. United States, 
390 u.s. 377, 88 s.ct. 1967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), as 
the leading case in the area of photographic lineups, 
he fails to apply its holding. In the Simmons case, the 
FBI agents obtained a series of pictures from the sister 
of one of the accused individuals. The pictures consisted 
mostly of group photographs and from that array the 
defendants were identified. The number and quality of 
photographs shown to the witnesses were not produced at 
tr1al; however the court noted the fact that both 
de~e~~ants appeared in several of the pictures from which 
-7-
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the witnesses made their pre-trial identifications. In 
rejecting the appellant's contention that the use of the 
photographs was done in such a way as to be unduly 
prejudicial the court held: 
. . that each case must be considered 
on its own facts, and that convictions based 
on eyewitness identification at trial 
following a pretrial identification by 
photograph will be set aside on the ground 
only if the photographic identification 
procedure was so impermisslbly suggestive 
as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
Id. at page 384 (emphasis added). 
In applying the standard to the facts of the 
Simmons case tts ccurt looked at several factors, to 
include the JU~t~fication of the FBI in using the photo-
graphic array, the likelihood that the procedure used 
may have produced a misidentification based on the inability 
of the witnesses to identify the defendants, and whether 
the witnesses had been contradictory in their identification 
of the defendants at any stage of the proceeding. The court 
concluded that each witness had seen the defendants in a 
well-lighted setting for up to five minutes, no masks 
had been used by the defendants, and the witnesses were 
consistent throughout in their identification of the 
defendant Simmons. As a result the court refused to 
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Applying the holding and analysis used by the 
Court in Simmons to the case at hand results in a 
similar conclusion. At the time the photographs were 
shown to the victim, the perpetrator of the most 
serious crime was still unidentified. The police attempt 
to identify the robber by showing the victim a series of 
pictures was clearly as justifiable in this case as it was in 
Simmons. Additionally, the victim stated that he was 
with his assailant for at least 15 minutes in a setting 
which was sufficiently well lit to allow him to see the 
face of the robber clearly at least on five separate 
occasions during that time. Additionally, he stated that 
he concentrated on his assailant's face to insure his 
ability to identify that individual at a later date. The 
photographs of the appellant were shown to the appellant 
within six or seven days on the first occasion and about 
three weeks after the incident on the second, insuring 
the opportunity to identify the individual while his 
memory was fresh. On both occasions the victim viewed 
at least seven photographs which had been chosen from 
larger groups because of their similarity to the features 
of the appellant. Detective Abbott testified that at the 
time he showed the photo arrays to the victim, he asked 
him to look at them and see if the man who robbed him was 
one of the individuals included in the array (R.l75). 
-9-
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There is no evidence to suggest that the victim was 
directed to the picture of the accused by any of the 
procedures employed by the police officer. While in 
Simmons the defendants were both included in several 
of the pictures shown to the witnesses, in the case at 
hand the victim saw one picture of the appellant in one 
array, and another picture of the appellant during the 
second lineup. The pictures of the appellant were 
substantially different, one being two years older than 
the other. In fact the victim did not think he had picked 
a picture of the same man in the lineups. 
Unde~ t~ose circumstances the victim identified 
the picture cf ~Ge appellant at the first lineup as being 
similar as to the hair style. At the second lineup the 
victim positively identified the appellant before even 
looking at all of the pictures. It is significant that 
the second photograph of the appellant, which was so clearly 
identified by Mr. Lealaitafea, had been taken more contempor~~ 
with the time frame of the robbery than the first photograph. 
Hence, although the victim was unsure as to the first 
photograph, the second photo matched absolutely his memory 
of his assailant. At the preliminary hearing and at 
trial there was absolutely no uncertainty on the 
victim's part that the appellant was the sane individual 
-10-
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that robbed him and shot him on the night of July 17, 
1978. The facts in this case are more compelling than 
those of the Simmons case, and clearly call for the 
conclusion that the procedures used during the pre-trial 
identification stage were not impermissibly suggestive 
and evidence thereof was properly admitted for the 
jury's consideration by the trial court. 
In adopting the holding of the Simmons case, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah turned away from 
a rigid formula and held that each case must be reviewed 
individually and scrutinized carefully to insure that the 
identification procedures employed were not so suggestive 
as to preclude the witness from making an identification 
based on his own knowledge and observation, rather than 
as a result of the procedures themselves. State v. Perry, 
27 Utah 2d 48, 429 P. 2d 1349 (1972). In subsequent 
cases, with facts not at all unlike those of the case 
at hand, the Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed lower 
court decisions admitting evidence derived from the use 
of pretrial photographic lineups. State v. Wettstein, 
28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972); State v. Jenkins, 
523 P.2d 1232 (1974). In Wettstein, the Court held that 
even though the only picture shown with a mustache was 
that of the defendant, under all of the circumstances the 
trial court properly found that the identification was not 
l~duced by ~he conduct of the photographic display. The 
-11-
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lower court's decision in this case to admit the 
testimony concerning the pre-trial identification 
of the accused is factually in harmony with the entire 
line of cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
concerning this question. 
In his brief the appellant cites United States 
v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182 (1975), and United States v. 
Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in support of 
his contention that the procedures used during the pretrial 
identification process were unduly prejudicial and the 
evidence derived therefrom should be excluded. However, 
both of the cases cited are distinguishable as to their 
facts, and a~e ~lsapplied in the case at hand. 
In the Sanders case, the photographs presented 
to the witnesses included only two which showed an 
individual with any facial hair. One of these individuals 
had a mustache, very short sideburns and a slight goatee. 
That individual was also not dark in complexion. The picture 
of the defendant was the other showing a man with facial 
hair, and he had a heavy mustache, and sideburns down to 
his goatee or beard, which was full. He also had a much 
darker complexion and the picture showed him to be much 
heavier than the other individuals whose photographs were 
shown to the witnesses. ht the lineup, the defendant was 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the tallest man, and the only heavy-set stout person who 
had a full mustache and full goatee. United States v. 
Sanders, supra at 1196. Additionally, the defendant was 
the only individual to appear in both the photo array and 
the lineup and one of the witnesses stated that she was 
better able to identify the defendant because of the 
identification procedure. Under the circumstances presented 
and consistent with its holding in Simmons v. United States, 
supra, the Court held: 
The initial photographic identification 
procedures were impermissibly suggestive 
. We have examined the photographs shown 
to the witnesses, and the photographs of 
the lineup. The stark fact is that appellant 
fairly leaps out of the pictures as the 
one person who is different. . . When there 
is added to the equation the fact that 
t~ese are distinctive characteristics 
attributed to the robber . . and that 
he was the one man whose photograph had 
previously been shown to both witnesses, 
it was well-nigh inevitable that he would 
be chosen in the circumstances. 
United States v. Sanders, supra at 1197 (emphasis added). 
what the court objected to was the impermissibly 
suggestive pre-trial identification procedure taken as 
a whole, which was used in the case. Sanders does not 
stand for the proposition, as the appellant contends, 
-13-
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that if two lineups are conducted and the appellant's 
picture is the only one used in both, the subsequent 
identification is impermissibly tainted. That is 
but one of the factors that must be considered, and 
absent a combination of other factors which also 
taint the procedure, that circumstance alone would 
not require the exclusion of evidence of such a 
procedure. Except for the use of a picture of the 
appellant in both photographic arrays, the other 
factors present in Sanders are missing from this case, 
and it is therefore not applicable. The victim in 
the case before t~e Court had adequate opportunity 
to see his assailant; there were not impermissibly 
suggestive statements made by the police while 
conducting the photographic lineups; the evidence 
suggests that the pictures used in both lineups 
were chosen because of their similarity to the 
appellant, and the second group of photographs 
introduced at trial verify that fact; and finally 
the victim's description and testimony have remained 
consistent based on his observation of the appellant 
at the time of the robbery. Respondent therefore 
submits that the findings of the lower court are 
clearly consistent with the holding of United States v. 
Sanders and should be affirmed. 
-14-
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In the Keller case, the Court refused to allow a 
conviction to stand when the witness was unable to identify 
the defendant in court, and merely stated at the pre-trial 
indentification stage that of the pictures he viewed, the 
defendant's picture looked most like the individual who 
committed the alleged crime. Clearly those facts, and the 
holding of the Court in that case do not apply in the present 
situation. 
The Courts have been given substantial discretion 
in attempting to determine under what circumstances pretrial 
identification procedures are impermissibly suggestive. 
State v. Perry, supra. In United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 
884 (1970) the lOth Circuit held that it was not impermissibly 
suggestive for the police to show the witness two groups of 
photographs with a picture of the defendant in both. In that 
case the witness failed to identify the defendant from a group 
of three black and white photographs. At a subsequent array 
the witness was shown 3 color photographs and one black and 
white photograph. Two of those pictures were of the defendant 
and the witness successfully identified both. The Court did 
not find that improper, and noted in conclusion that the 
inability of one witness to identify the defendant reinforced 
the finding that the government's techniques were not overly 
sugges=ivc. Id. at page 887. See also United States v. 
-15-
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Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (1971). In United States v. Munn, 
507 F.2d 563 (1974) a witness was shown seven photographs, 
each of which was a male caucasian, each was of the same 
general age grouping; each had considerable hair and of a 
similar color; four were clean shaven and three were not. 
The Court held that the array was not impermissibly suggestive 
and rejected the defendant's contention that it was. Several 
other lOth Circuit decisions have upheld a variety of procedurE 
used in conducting pretrial identification procedures. 
United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 882 (1973); United States 
v. Woodring, 446 F.2d 733 (1971); United States v. Milano, 
443 F.2d 1022 r::_gn). The courts have consistently upheld 
government procedures which have included a variety of 
procedures not dissimilar from the o~e used in the case at 
hand. The mere fact that the photograph of the defendant was 
included in both lineups does not make the procedure impermis-' 
sibly suggestive and the appellant cannot cite any authority 
that it does. On the contrary, the cases squarely support 
the conclusion that under the circumstances, the steps taken 
during the pretrial identification stage were not unduly 
suggestive and evidence derived therefrom was properly admit:c 
by the lower court. 
The appellant's second arc;ument concerning the iss·;' 
of due process deprivations is based on the gov0rnrnent's 
-16-
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inability to produce the photographs used at the first 
lineup. Detective Abbott testified that he picked seven 
photographs from a bulletin board containing roughly ten 
or twelve photographs. After presenting them to the victim 
for his inspection he returned the photographs to the bulletin 
board. As a result they were not available to the defense 
or the Court at the time of trial. 
Although the appellant states in his brief that the 
issue here presented has not been decided, respondent cites 
for the Court's consideration the case of State v. Volberding, 
infra, and submits that it is dispositive of this issue. 
The facts are nearly identical and the court's ruling is 
exactly on point. 
In that case the demand that the photographic array 
be reproduced could not be met because the pictures used had 
been returned to the Sheriff's files. In that case, as in 
t~e case at hand, there was no evidence of negligence on the 
~art of the officer conducting the lineup nor was there a 
showing of any intentional suppression of evidence in order 
to undermine the rights of the defendant. The court in the 
face of an argument nearly identical to the one made by the 
a?pellant, reasoned that: 
Such a claim must be evaluated in 
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Defendant argues that such an eval-
uation cannot be made without repro-
duction of the display. Such a 
contention is without merit, particularly 
in light of SiJ11I:lons, Ylrhere the photographs 
displayed to witnesses were not produced 
to the court . 
. the two witnesses observed the 
defendant for approximately one hour 
and conversed with him. The photographic 
display was made the following day, while 
the memories of the witnesses were still 
fresh. There was justification to use 
this procedure, since defendant had not 
been apprehended. The foregoing factual 
circumstances concerning defendant's 
identification do not establish a denial 
of due process of law (emphasis added) . 
State v. Volberding, 30 Utah 2d 257, at 259, 516 P.2d 
357 (1973). 
Addi tior.a::_::_, ::-. \'olberding, supra, the Court rejected the 
appellant's argument that he was denied his right to conduct 
a meaningful cross-examination because of the unavailability 
of the photographic display at trial. Id. at page 259. 
Appellant contends that to uphold the lower Court's decision 
in this case would be tantamount to extending an invitation 
to law enforcement personnel to deliberately or recklessl'y 
destroy evidence after it had served its purpose. However, 
the court has addressed this issue and correctly held that 
a deliberate suppression or destruction of evidence by those 
charged with the prosecution constitutes a denial of due 
process. State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Ctah 1975). The 
-18-
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line of cases cited by the appellant are a restatement of 
that position which has been clearly resolved by the State 
Supreme Court. The respondent does not take issue with 
the holding in Stewart, but submits that in the case at 
hand, the decision in Volberding is dispositive of the issue 
and can be applied to this case without conflicting with 
cases dealing with deliberate or reckless destruction of the 
evidence, and without fear of promoting the willful destruction 
of evidence by those charged with the prosecutorial function. 
Appellant cites the case of State v. Wright, 557 
P.2d l (Wash. 1976) and urges the court to adopt its holding 
in this case as a basis for reversing the lower court. 
Respondent contends that the issue as to suppression of 
evidence and its due process impact resolved by the court 
in lvright, supra, was compatibly resolved in Utah by virtue 
of the Stewart decision. Additionally it must be pointed out 
that the facts in Wright are such that even if the court 
concludes that Wright does not stand for the same proposition 
as Stewart, its facts are such that it should not be applied 
in t~e case before the court. 
As pointed out by the Court in Wright, the evidence 
sou~h~ by the appellant in the present case was intimately 
related ~o the very existence of a homicide. Additionally, 
th·~ cc•urt found: 
-19- l 
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. there was a reasonable possibility 
that the evidence destroyed by the police 
or at their direction was material to 
guilt or innocence and favorable to 
appellant. 
State v. Wright, supra, at page 6. 
Respondent does not see the same compelling circumstance in 
this case, that would warrant a similar conclusion reached 
in the Wright case. The photographic array at which the 
pictures were used, did not even result in a positive 
identification of the appellant. Their importance is further 
reduced by substantial evidence proving an independent basis 
for the victim's in-court identification of the accused. 
Assuming ther'C'f:::r·2, tchat even if the photographs had been 
produced and were found to be procedurally tainted, the 
evidence which appellant urges the court to exclude, would 
still be admissible based on its independent basis. United 
States v. Wade; State v. Vasquez, supra. Hence, \rlright, ~' 
and the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the appellant 
are distinguishable in law and fact, and do not merit 
individual discussion in light of State v. Volberding, supra, 
which respondent respectfully submits is dispositive of 
appellant's due process argument. 
COHCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the failure of the government to 
produce the requested photographs at trial, the lower court 
-20-
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was well within its discretion in finding the appellant 
guilty in this case. The in-court identification was based 
on the victim's independent observations and recollections 
at the time of the robbery and not as a result of the pretrial 
identification procedure. 
The procedure used by the police at both lineups 
was consistent with the due process requirements of the 
14th Amendment, and the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case 
of State v. Volberding, supra, has already held that it is 
not necessary that the government reproduce the photographic 
array for the defense at trial. 
For the above-stated reasons the reapondent urges 
this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of the 
accused. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. H&"lSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL D. SMITH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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